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Over the last decade, Queer Studies have become Global Queer Studies, generating 
significant insights into key international political processes.  Yet the transformation 
from Queer to Global Queer has left the discipline of International Relations largely 
unaffected, which begs the question:  If Queer Studies have gone global, why hasn’t 
the discipline of International Relations gone somewhat queer?  Or, to put it in Martin 
Wight’s provocative terms, why is there no queer international theory? This article 
claims that the presumed non-existence of queer international theory is an effect of 
how the discipline of IR combines homologization, figuration and gentrification to 
code various types of theory as failures in order to manage the conduct of 
international theorizing in all its forms.  This means there are generalizable lessons to 
be drawn from how the discipline categorizes queer international theory out of 
existence to bring a specific understanding of IR into existence. 	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Since its formation as an academic field, Queer Studies has questioned “the 
uniformity of sexual identities,” tracing how sexual and gender variance undo fixed 
identity categories like gay, lesbian, and straight.  This led to theorizations of 
sexuality and gender as flexible, often anti-normative, and increasingly politicized 
(Duggan, 2003).   Most of this work involved thinking sex, sexuality and their 
performances on a personal, institutional or national scale (Rubin, 1984; Butler, 1990; 
Berlant and Freeman,1992).  In response to contemporary global incidents ranging 
from “the triumph of neoliberalism” to the “infinite ‘war on terrorism’” to “the 
pathologizing of immigrant communities as ‘terrorists’” (Eng et al, 2005:1), Queer 
Studies has largely transformed itself into Global Queer Studies (GQS).  In this guise, 
it produces significant insights on the global workings of “race, on the problems of 
transnationalism, on conflicts between global capital and labor, on issues of diaspora 
and immigration, and on questions of citizenship, national belonging, and 
necropolitics” (Eng et al, 2005:20; also see Povinelli and Chauncey, 1999).  GQS 
contributions to what are arguably the three core areas of International Relations (IR) 
research – war and peace, state and nation formation, and international political 
economy – are regularly featured in top-ranked journals and in top-ranked book series 
(e.g., Puar, 2007; Puar and Rai, 2002; Hoad, 2000; Binnie, 2004; Briggs, 2003; 
Luibhied and Cantu, 2005; Luibhied, 2002, 2007;  Kuntsman, 2009; Spurlin, 2013; 
	   3	  
Cruz-Malave and Manalansan, 2002; Eng et al, 2005, Khanna, 2007).  But not in the 
field of IR. 
 Strikingly, this resurgence of activity in and attention to GQS and to the 
scholarship it is producing has largely bypassed IR. Since Queer Studies made the 
turn to Global Queer Studies over the last decade, only six journal articles and no 
special issues on GQS-themes have been published in the top 20 impact-rated IR 
journals, and only one GQS-themed book has been published or commissioned by a 
top IR book series. 1 
 All of this begs the question - If Queer Studies has enhanced understandings of 
international politics by going global, why hasn’t IR gone somewhat queer?  Or, to 
paraphrase Martin Wight, why is there no queer international theory?  Three likely 
answers spring to mind.   
 Answer 1:  “IR scholars are not interested in queer-themed work.”  This may be 
the case for many, yet it does not account for the fact that membership in the 
International Studies Association (ISA) LGBTQA Caucus which (among other 
things) sponsors ISA panels is steadily growing.  Nor does it explain why the first 
interdisciplinary conference to focus on Queer IR2 received over 100 submissions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This data was generated from a Web of Knowledge search of the twenty IR journals with the highest 
impact ratings using the keywords “homosexuality,” “queer,” “homonationalism,” “pinkwashing,” 
“transsexual,” and “transgender” between 2003 and April 2013.  Searches yielded the following results:  
“homosexuality” – one article (Altman, 2007); “queer” – one article (Jauhola, 2010); 
“homonationalism” – no articles; “pinkwashing” – no articles; “transgender” or “transsexual” – three 
articles (RKM Smith, 2003; Kollman, 2007; Sjoberg, 2012).  Expanding the search to include “gay” 
and “lesbian” (which are terms queer theorists usually critique rather than embrace) yields just two 
additional results, neither of which discussed queer international theoretical issues.  Including 
‘sexuality’ yields five additional result, only one of which discussed queer international theoretical 
issues (Pratt, 2007). 
2 “Queer IR’ denotes GQS-themed scholarship by scholars in the discipline of IR.  “Queer International 
Theory” in the singular designates the only kind of GQS-themed work acceptable to Disciplinary IR.  
Lower-cased and pluralized “queer international theories” denotes GQS-themed work that exceeds the 
limits of Disciplinary IR and eschews Disciplinary IR’s ideal of Queer International Theory as a 
unified, singular metadiscourse (see Berlant and Warner, 1995).  
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drew 200 participants.3   
 Answer 2:  “This interest in GQS has not (yet) led IR scholars to produce any 
queer international theory.”  This answer ignores an expanding body of queer-themed 
work authored by IR scholars that dates back some 20 years (e.g., Weber, 1994a, 
1994b, 1998, 1999, 2002, forthcoming; Peterson, 1999, 2013; RKM Smith, 2003; 
Altman, 2006; Kelly, 2007; Pratt, 2007; Rao, 2010; Agathangelou, 2013; Marjaana, 
2010; Owens, 2010; Sjoberg, 2012; Sjoberg and Shepherd, 2013; Sabsay, 2013). Yet 
because most of this work is not published in IR outlets, this does contribute to the 
impression that there is no queer international theory.   
Answer 3:  “All of the GQS-themed work produced by IR scholars is so 
interdisciplinary that it lacks a primary focus on core IR concerns, which is why IR 
scholars are not interested in it and why it is not published in IR outlets.”  Yet the 
primary foci of most queer-themed work published by IR scholars are classic IR 
themes such as war, security, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, 
empire, colonialism, and the general practice of foreign policy.  Of particular 
relevance to IR scholars are investigations that explore how failing hegemonic states 
perform queerness through their conduct of interventions and wars to solidify their 
hegemonic status (Weber, 1999), how states produce themselves and their citizens as 
pro-LGBT subjects in part to constitute other states, ‘civilizations’ or peoples as 
national and global threats (Puar, 2003), how the articulation and circulation of global 
(economic) value through queer and racialized bodies supports the practices of 
empires (Agathangelou, 2013; Scott, 2013), and more generally how ‘queer’ is 
mobilized to designate some state practices as progressive and others as non-
progressive as a mechanism to divide the world into orderly vs. disorderly  (anarchic) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The 2nd Annual International Feminist Journal of Politics conference on “(Im)Possibly Queer 
International Feminisms,” University of Sussex, May 17-19, 2013. 
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spaces (Puar, 2003; Agathangelou, 2013; Haritaworn et al, 2013; Rao, forthcoming; 
Remkus, forthcoming). 
 This suggests that multiple queer international theories do exist, which means 
we need to ask a different question:  Why does there appear to be no Queer 
International Theory? 
 My claim is that the presumed non-existence of Queer International Theory 
cannot be explained merely by its absence from prestigious IR journals and book 
series because this absence is the (un)conscious effect of how so-called Disciplinary 
IR codes various types of theory as failures.  “Disciplinary IR” – which aspires to be 
but is not equivalent to the discipline of IR as a whole – is, of course, as imagined as 
it is enacted, and it changes as social, cultural, economic, and political forces change.  
Yet at any particular historical moment, IR scholars have a working knowledge of 
Disciplinary IR because it embodies the general commitments and standards that 
regulate, manage, and normalize “the conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 1994:237) 
regarding IR publishing, funding, hiring, promotion and tenure decisions.  While there 
are certainly institutional and national variations in how these standards are enacted 
(Hoffmann, 1977; Waever, 1998), most IR academics are required to justify their 
work with regard to these standards at some point in their careers. 
 Disciplinary IR’s commitments and standards are as much the performative 
result of so-called “mainstream” agendas of learned societies, universities, 
independent funding agencies and governments that support socially, culturally, 
economically, or politically “policy-relevance”, “usefulness” or “impactful” research 
as they are the performative outcome of so-called “dissident” practices (Ashley and 
Walker, 1990; also see Soreanu, 2010) that seek to rewrite, resist or rebel against so-
called mainstream agendas, be they “scientific”, “positivist”, or “neoliberal”, for 
example.  Together, these intricately intertwined positions produce a Disciplinary IR 
that claims to speak for the whole of the discipline of IR because it wields sufficient 
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power to (de)legitimate IR scholars and their work for many user communities.  
Because of its power, Disciplinary IR is as often contested as it is assimilated to by IR 
scholars of virtually all intellectual dispositions.4 
 A central tenant of what I am calling Disciplinary IR is embedded in the work 
of Martin Wight.  Wight claimed that for international theorizing to succeed, it must 
accumulate knowledge about interstate relations (Wight, 1966; Smith, 2000).   My 
claim is that from a Disciplinary IR perspective, theories – including queer 
international theories – fail because they are judged not to be making progress toward 
this goal.  This is what explains the subsequent absence of queer international theories 
from prestigious IR journals and book series and the presumed non-existence of 
Queer International Theory. 
  To substantiate this claim, I investigate how Disciplinary IR employs three 
strategies - homologization, figuration, and gentrification - to make it appear as if 
there is no Queer International Theory.  Homologization describes the act of using a 
homology to describe relationships, relative positions and structures in a set of 
elements in order to prescribe how relationships ought to be ordered and how 
elements and their aims ought to be valued (e.g., Wight, 1966).5  Figuration describes 
the act of employing semiotic tropes that combine knowledges, practices, and power 
to shape how we map our worlds and understand actual things in those worlds 
(Haraway, 1997).  Gentrification describes the replacement of mix with homogeneity 
while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (Schulman, 2012).   
 My analysis is grounded in Martin Wight’s famous homology “Politics is to 
International Politics as Political Theory is to Historical Interpretation.”  This is not 
only because Wight’s homology illustrates and/or authorizes homologization, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Disciplinization also occurs within and amongst Queer and Critical IR traditions, sometimes to police 
Disciplinary IR agendas and sometimes to police resistance to these agendas (Foster et al, 1997). 
5 Wight published two versions of his essay. Unless otherwise noted, all of my references are to the 
more widely-read 1966 version. 
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figuration, and gentrification.  It is also because Wight’s homology elegantly 
encapsulates how Disciplinary IR has traditionally thought of itself since its formation 
in the wake of World War I – as separate but parallel to the discipline of politics and 
as capable of achieving its aim to produce unique cumulative knowledge about 
international politics only if it models itself on how political theory is practiced.  In 
the 1960s, Wight mobilized this generalized view to make his case for an historical 
approach to the study of IR – both as a participant in the first “great debate” over 
method and methodology between traditionalists and behavioralists and as an 
historian who founded an International Relations department.  This in part accounts 
for Wight’s contentious claim that international theory can only succeed if it 
transforms itself into historical interpretation and his contentious placement of the 
term “Historical Interpretation” in the place one would expect to find the term 
“International Theory” in his homology.  IR debates about methodology and history 
have certainly moved on since Wight’s time (e.g., Lapid, 1989; Rosenberg, 2006).  
Even so, the values and relationships expressed in Wight’s homology are still widely 
accepted in Disciplinary IR, to the point that Wight’s homology remains a 
generalizable guide to regulating how international theorizing ought to be conducted. 
  Beginning with Martin Wight’s homology, I trace how Wight’s strategy of 
homologization equates international theory and the discipline of International 
Relations with failure, authorizes the figuration of specific types of international 
theory and specific ways of producing international theory as failures, and embraces a 
gentrified strategy of substitution as a legitimate response to these failures.  Applying 
these logics to queer international theories, I suggest that homologization, figuration 
and gentrification combine to make it appear as if there is no Queer International 
Theory.  In so doing, they authorize the discipline of IR (on Disciplinary IR’s behalf) 
to dismiss queer international theories as International Theory, resulting in negative 
consequences not only for the scholars who produce this type of work but for the 
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discipline of IR as a whole.  
 I conclude by reflecting on the costs of using Wight’s homology to regulate, 
manage and normalize the scholarly conduct of international theorizing – for queer 
international theories and for the discipline of IR as a whole.  I argue that while most 
scholars in the discipline (un)consciously embraces Wight’s homology as their guide 
to disciplinary success, my analysis of Queer International Theory reveals that 
Wight’s homology has three detrimental effects on the discipline:  it limits how 
international politics is enriched by critical inquiry, it cedes consideration of key 
international phenomena to other disciplines, and it paradoxically leads to disciplinary 
failure on the discipline’s own terms.   
 Because the case of Queer International Theory illustrates how Disciplinary IR 
manages not just queer international theories but all theories that profess to be 
International Theory, generalizable lessons can be drawn from this case for the 
discipline as a whole.  Primary among these is that IR’s disciplinary attachment to 
Wight’s homology compromises possibilities for doing international theorizing and 
thinking international politics not only on terms the discipline rejects but on terms the 
discipline embraces. 
 
 
Homologizing Failure 
 
 
Politics:International Politics = Political Theory:Historical Interpretation 
         - Martin Wight (1966:33) 
 
 
 This is the first and most famous example of a homology in IR.  The origin of 
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this homology is Martin Wight’s essay “Why there is no international theory?,” where 
his homology serves as his summary statement on the discipline of IR and its 
relationships to the fields of political theory and history.  What Wight’s essay offers 
IR is a cautionary tale about how not to produce failing international theory and a 
curative tale about how to successfully revive a discipline whose theoretical 
endeavors have led it astray.  The power and influence of Wight’s essay and the 
homology at its core are undeniable.  Whether to embrace, debate, or refine it, 
Wight’s argument is so rehearsed in IR through teaching and research (e.g., 
Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1990; Smith, 1995; Weber, 1998a; Rosenberg, 2006; 
Snidal and Wendt, 2009, Amitav and Buzan, 2010) that his essay “has almost iconic 
status in IR so that in reading it one is reading the discipline itself” (Epp, 1996). 
 My aim in this section is to explain how Wight’s essay homologizes failure and 
charts the acceptable pathway to overcoming failure by using a homology to describe 
relationships, relative positions and structures in a set of elements in order to prescribe 
how relationships ought to be ordered and how elements and their aims ought to be 
valued.  My analysis unfolds in three moves.  First, I analyze how Wight’s homology 
allows him to argue that there is no International Theory.  Second, I discuss how 
Wight’s homology regulates, manages, and normalizes scholarly conduct within the 
discipline and why this matters for international theorizing.  Finally, I draw upon both 
of these arguments to explain how Wight’s homology sets up Queer International 
Theory as failure. 
 The key to understanding Wight’s homology lies in grasping the function of its 
third term, Political Theory.  Political Theory is the foundational or ‘master’ term  
against which all other terms in the homology are evaluated.  As such, its own 
meaning is self-evident and beyond question, and the meaning and value of every 
other term in Wight’s homology flow from Wight’s understanding of Political 
Theory. 
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 Wight opens his essay by defining Political Theory as “a phrase that in general 
requires no explanation…[that] denotes speculation about the state” (1966:17) and 
International Theory as “a tradition of speculation about relations between states” 
(1966:17).  Wight then offers us a logical argument that appears to be logically 
impossible.  As “a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state to 
which the name ‘political theory’ is appropriated” (1966:17), Wight suggests that 
International Theory fails to exist because it fails to measure up to its twin Political 
Theory.  For Wight, this is why there is no International Theory.  Wight’s essay 
elaborates on this unusual formulation of theoretical failure and seeks to discover if 
there is an alternative tradition of speculation about relations between states that 
succeeds where International Theory fails. 
 Wight elaborates on how International Theory fails to measure up to Political 
Theory in both function and content.  Political Theory exists primarily because it 
fulfills its function to accurately reflect the content of politics.  It does this by telling 
the story of how state’s strive through their domestic political process to achieve ‘the 
good life’ (Wight, 1966:33).  Political Theory exists secondarily because it has a 
succession of classic texts that document its story.  Put in terms of Wight’s homology, 
Politics equals Political Theory.  International Theory, in contrast, does not exist 
because it does not fulfill its function to reflect the content of international political 
processes.  It does not tell the story of how states’ diplomats grapple with the 
‘recurrence and repetition’ of interstate conflicts (Wight, 1966:33) in order to ensure 
the survival of their states.  This explains why International Theory is “scattered, 
unsystematic, and mostly inaccessible to the layman” (1966:20) and why “there is no 
succession of first-rank books about the states-system and diplomacy like the 
succession of political classics from Bodin to Mill” (1966:18).   
 Because for Wight International Theory does not equal International Politics, 
Wight excludes the term International Theory from his homology altogether.  But 
	   11	  
Wight’s homology is not incomplete.  It is not Politics:International Politics = 
Political Theory:Nothing Whatsoever.  Rather, in the place where we would expect to 
find the term International Theory, Wight’s homology uses the term ‘Historical 
Interpretation’.  Politics:International Politics = Political Theory:Historical 
Interpretation.  For Wight, this substitution of Historical Interpretation for 
International Theory is valid because the only type of theory that describes things as 
they are in international politics is Historical Interpretation.  This is because, for 
Wight, it is only Historical Interpretation that makes it its “business to study the 
states-system, the diplomatic community itself” (1966:22).  International Politics 
equals Historical Interpretation. 
 This is a forceful set of propositions, which Wight appears to submit to his 
reader with caution. He writes, “[I]f one came to the point of offering the equation 
Politics:International Politics = Political Theory:Historical Investigation it would be 
tentatively, aware of a problem posed and a challenge delivered” (Wight, 1960:48).6  
Yet apart from this one qualifying sentence, there is nothing cautious or tentative 
about Wight’s homologization.  It is definitive in how it defines the relationships, 
relative positions and structures of Politics, Political Theory, International Politics, 
International Theory, and Historical Interpretation and in how it orders and values 
these elements and their relationships.  As a result, it is definitive in posing the non-
existence of International Theory as a problem to be solved.  And it is definitive in 
suggesting that solving this problem lies in the challenge of reforming what Wight 
views as inadequate international theories into or reforming them with Historical 
Interpretation, which just happens to be how Wight (an international historian) studies 
international politics.  Or, again, to put it in Wight’s terms, International Politics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Here I am citing from Wight’s originally published 1960 article because in this version of the piece 
Wight more hesitantly offers his homology.  In the revised 1966 version, Wight writes, “So one might 
venture tentatively to put forward the equation:  Politics:International Politics = Political 
Theory:Historical Interpretation” (1966:32-33). 
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equals Historical Interpretation, therefore International Theory must equal Historical 
Interpretation if International Theory is to exist. 
 The effects of Wight’s homologization are significant.  By homologizing his 
argument, Wight elevates a series of biases and assumptions into apparent 
mathematical facts – that there is only one correct way to conceive of Political Theory 
and International Theory, that Political Theory as Wight defines it should be the 
starting point for thinking about the definition and role of International Theory, that 
Politics and International Politics are singular, separate realms of conduct that must be 
accounted for by separate bodies of theory, that these bodies of theory either do 
represent or should represent things as they really are in a neutral and unbiased way, 
that these neutral, unbiased accounts of the world can and should result in a sustained 
progression of cumulative knowledge about their field of inquiry, and that if they fail 
to do this then they do not properly exist as bodies of theory.   The overall effect of 
how Wight employs his homology is to naturalize some very problematic ideas about 
the existence of Political Theory and International Theory in the singular, about the 
existence of a rigid domestic/international boundary, about the nature of language and 
aims of theory and knowledge, and about what kinds of theory and knowledge are 
valuable. 
 Wight’s homologization has further effects because of the way it has been taken 
up by Disciplinary IR.  Because reading Wight’s essay is akin to “reading the 
discipline itself” (Epp, 1996), Wight’s homology performs the same task in 
Disciplinary IR that the term Political Theory performs in Wight’s homology; it is a 
foundational point of reference that gives meaning, value, and proper positioning to 
other terms/theories/disciplines that come into contact with it.  In this way, Wight’s 
homology orients IR theorists toward what Disciplinary IR claims the discipline of IR 
is, ought to be, and could be if its members were to follow Wight’s advice.  This is 
what allows Wight’s homology to perform as a normalizing technology in the 
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Foucauldian sense, in that it regulates, manages, and normalizes the scholarly conduct 
of international theorizing within the discipline of IR (Foucault, 1994:237) in the 
sense that it guides the behavior of IR theorists down specific approved routes for 
creating International Theory and for marking those who stray off these approved 
paths as failures. 
 This does not mean that all IR theorists agree with Wight that every kind of 
international theory apart from Historical Interpretation is a failure.  Rather, it means 
that it is to Wight’s homology that a surprising array of IR scholars turn when they 
attempt to systematically differentiate amongst various types of theory and to consider 
how to correct those strains of theory that they believe fail the discipline because they 
stray down the wrong paths to theory-making.  Just as Wight wielded his homology to 
figure International Theory as a failure and to legitimate the substitution of Historical 
Interpretation for International Theory, so too have recent scholars employed Wight’s 
homology to figure contemporary expressions of international theories as failures and 
to substitute the pathway to their favored theory as the legitimate road to theoretical 
success (e.g., Buzan and Little, 2001; Rosenberg, 2006; Snidal and Wendt, 2009; 
Amitav and Buzan, 2010). 
Even those scholars who do not overtly employ Wight’s homology often 
unconsciously abide by its recommendations.  If they do not, they risk not being 
recognized as proper international relations theorists.  In this way, then, Wight’s 
homology normalizes the conduct of international theorizing rather broadly in the 
discipline of IR because it governs how a critical mass of IR scholars (un)consciously 
think about international theories in general and about their own practices as 
international theorists specifically.  
 This is what makes Wight’s homology so dangerous and so powerful. It is 
dangerous because it is a highly biased expression of what politics, theory and 
knowledge ought to look like in Disciplinary IR’s view of the discipline of IR, that is 
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applied to the discipline as if it were objective.  It is powerful because it functions as a 
technology of differentiation to designate failure and pathways to success for 
international theories that can be applied to normalize (by validating, dismissing or 
correcting) any type of theory and theorist that/who would dare to make a claim to be 
(doing) International Theory. 
 This is why Wight’s homologization of international theories matters for queer 
international theories.  For when Wight’s observations about International Theory are 
applied to Queer International Theory, queer international theories are homologized 
out of existence.   
 Like International Theory, Queer International Theory “does not, at first sight, 
exist” (Wight, 1966:17) because it fails to measure up to its “twin” Queer Political 
Theory in content and in function.  This is for three reasons.  First, queer international 
theories lack a substantial, significant body of classical texts (Wight, 1966:17) that 
Queer Political Theory provides (from Foucault, [1976/1979] to Butler [1990] to De 
Laruetis  [1991] to Segwick [1991] for example), offering in its place scattered, 
unsystematic texts published almost exclusively in non-IR outlets. 
 Second, while queer international theories contribute to scholarly discussions 
about war, security and terrorism (Weber, 2002; Owens, 2010), states and nationalism 
(Weber, 1998b; Peterson, 1999, 2013), sovereignty, intervention, hegemony (Weber, 
1994a, 1994b,1999; Pratt, 2007), empire (Agathangelou, 2013) and other international 
forms of violence, they do not restrict themselves to focusing on “high politics” or 
“the states-system, the diplomatic community itself “ (Wight, 1966:22).  Instead, they 
often twin the content of Queer Political Theory by using an array of interdisciplinary 
high and low theories, epistemologies, and methods (see Sedgwick, 1991) that defy 
Wight’s tidy boundaries between Politics and International Politics, between Political 
Theory and International Theory, and between successful and unsuccessful 
knowledge accumulation to describe Queer International Politics “as they really are.”   
	   15	  
 This is widely seen as acceptable practice in queer political theorizing in general 
because queer political practices are themselves so mixed that they can only 
accurately be described with a mix of theories, epistemologies, methodologies and 
foci.  But it is infrequently viewed as acceptable practice in Disciplinary IR 
theorizing.  This is because Disciplinary IR rarely recognizes boundary-breaking 
theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches to international 
theorizing as being productive of valuable knowledge about international politics 
(Weber, 2013).7  What this means in Wight’s terms, then, is that queer international 
theories stray too far from telling the one true story that all International Theory must 
tell – the story about the survival of states in the states-system.  And they stray too far 
from deploying acceptable approaches in telling the stories they do tell about 
international politics – approaches that use positivist methods to accumulate 
knowledge. 
 Finally, because much of the “low,” boundary-breaking content of queer 
international political processes is classified out of existence by Wight, Wight’s 
homology places queer international theories at a fork in the road where both paths 
lead to failure.  If queer international theories explore a mix of high and low, domestic 
and international queer international political processes using appropriate 
epistemologies and methodologies, they are faulted by Wight’s homology for 
twinning the content but not the function of its twin Queer Political Theory.  Yet if 
they neglect to explore this mix of queer international political processes, they are 
faulted for not reflecting international political processes “as they really are.”  
 What this means is that while it might be possible to claim that Queer Politics 
equals Queer Political Theory, Wight’s homology offers no successful route to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The exception is when low/popular/cultural insights are formulated as “soft power” in the service of 
state power by mobilizing epistemologies and methodologies that do not threaten positivist knowledge 
accumulation.  See Nye, 2004. 
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claim that Queer International Politics equals Queer International Theory.  This is 
how queer international theories are homologized as failures.  
 Because queer international theories are (un)consciously homologized as failing 
the discipline of IR, Queer International Theory is, following Wight’s contestable 
logic, deemed to be non-existent.  And Disciplinary IR’s next logical step is to again 
follow in Wight’s footsteps, by substituting a “successful” type of International 
Theory in its place.  Wight’s homologization of theory, then, first authorizes the 
figuring of various types of theory as failures and then authorizes their substitution 
with successful theory.  Explaining how these processes work in relation to queer 
international theories is the task of the next two sections. 
 
 
Figuring Failure 
 
 
“Failure is the map of political paths not taken, though it does not chart a completely 
separate land; failure’s by-ways are all the spaces in between 
 the superhighways of capital.” 
        -Judith Jack Halberstam (2011:19) 
 
 My argument so far has focused on how Martin Wight’s famous essay renders 
international theories – and particularly queer international theories – non-existent by 
homologizing them as failures.  In this section, I will extend this discussion to the 
figuration of failure by pursuing two aims.  The first is to examine how Wight’s 
homologization of international theories (including queer international theories) 
illustrates and authorizes the figuration of failure.  I do this by applying a simplified 
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version of Donna Haraway’s theorization of figuration to Wight’s homology.8  The 
second is to analyze how Wight’s homology thwarts attempts to celebrate queer 
international theories as what Judith Jack Halberstam calls “successful failure”, a 
concept that has recently gained traction amongst some queer IR scholars.  To do this, 
I read Wight’s figuration of theoretical failure in tandem with Halberstam’s work on 
queer (as) failure. 
 Haraway describes figuration as the act of employing semiotic tropes that 
combine knowledges, practices, and power to shape how we map our worlds and 
understand actual things in those worlds (1997). Haraway argues that figurations take 
specific form through their reliance on tropes, temporalities, performances, and 
worldings (1997:11).   
 Tropes are material and semiotic references to actual things that express how 
we understand actual things.  Tropes are not “literal or self-identical” to the things 
they describe (Haraway, 1997:11).  Rather, tropes are figures of speech.  Haraway 
argues that “[a]ll language, including mathematics, is figurative, that is, made of 
tropes, constituted by bumps that make us swerve from literal-mindedness” (Haraway, 
1997:11).  This is because all language – textual, visual, artistic – involves “at least 
some kind of displacement that can trouble identifications and certainties” (Haraway, 
1997:11) between a figure and an actual thing.   
 Wight’s homology is a figuration that deploys a mathematical trope.  
Describing his homology as an equation (1960:22 and 1966:32), Wight invites a 
mathematical engagement with his homology, one that makes us “swerve from literal-
mindedness” (Haraway, 1997:11), away from the fact that (in this case) queer 
international theories exist to make us consider their non-existence.  It does this by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Haraway employs figuration to capture ideas about embodiment and materiality, which is not how 
Wight uses it.  Yet applying her categorization of the key elements of figuration to Wight’s 
homologization illuminates how Wight figures failure. 
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figuring relationships among actual bodies of theory and how we ought to understand 
them.  Wight’s homology is also figurative because it is temporal, performative, and 
worlding. 
 Haraway notes that figurations are historically rooted in “the semiotics of 
Western Christian realism”, which is embedded with a progressive, eschatological 
temporality.   Western Christian figures embody this progressive temporality because 
they hold the promise of salvation in the afterlife (Haraway, 1997:9).  This medieval 
notion of developmental temporality remains a vital aspect of contemporary 
figurations, even when figures take secular forms (e.g., when science promises to 
deliver us from evil with a new technological innovation; see Haraway, 1997:10). 
 Developmental progress as the route to secular salvation is equally present in 
Wight’s homology.  With the achievements of Queer Political Theory as its 
developmental goal, would-be Queer International Theory is advised by Wight to 
journey down the same path as its righteous twin by replicating Queer Political 
Theory’s project of accumulating knowledge to accurately reflect the realm of politics 
it should describe.  For Queer International Theory, this means making it its “business 
to study the states-system, the diplomatic community itself” (Wight, 1966:22).   
 Queer International Theory only comes into existence by performing the same 
function as Queer Political Theory.  This illustrates the performative aspect of 
figuration.  Performativity expresses how repeated iterations of acts constitute the 
subjects who are said to be performing them (Butler, 1999:xv).  Haraway argues that 
“[f]igurations are performative images that can be inhabited” (Haraway, 1997:11).  
Applying this to Wight’s homology, Queer Political Theory is the performative image 
– the body of knowledge that is the effect of ritualistically repeated practices of 
specific forms of knowledge collection - that Queer International Theory must inhabit 
through its disciplinary performances in order to exist. 
 What we have with Wight’s homology, then, is a figuration taking the form of 
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a mathematical equation that posits the pathway to success charted by Queer Political 
Theory as the developmental and performative goal of Queer International Theory.  
Wight’s homology shows queer international theories/theorists the one true path to 
theoretical success, and, in so doing, it delivers them from failure.  As the logical 
formula for disciplinary success, Wight’s homology maps the superhighway to the 
accumulation of intellectual capital and the disciplinary power that comes with it that 
queer international theories so far lack.   
 By charting this and only this course to theoretical and disciplinary success, 
Wight’s homology provides queer IR theorists with the final aspect that Haraway 
argues all figurations possess, worlding.  Like figurations in general, Wight’s 
homology “map[s] universes of knowledge, practice, and power” (Haraway,1997:11).  
Successful practice is “studying the states-system, the diplomatic community itself” 
(Wight, 1966:22).  Successful knowledge is the developmental, cumulative, and 
representational result of this practice.  And power is the disciplinary capital one 
acquires by being practically and knowledgably successful.  
 Wight’s figurations of theoretical success and failure are remarkably similar to 
Halberstam’s figurations of success and failure in queer theory.  But these figurations 
are valued and mobilized in significantly different ways.  While Wight’s aim is to 
identify failure so international theories (like queer international theories) can 
overcome it, Halberstam’s aim is to identify failure so queer theories and queer people 
can revel in it as a way of undoing disciplines and disciplinization.  This is 
strategically possible because Halberstam understands queer failure (a term he9 
borrows from Jose Munoz, 2010 and refines through the work of Lee Edleman, 2005) 
– as a productive negativity that can be deployed to “dismantle the logics of success 
and failure with which we currently live” (2011:2). 
 To make this case, Halberstam begins much like Wight does – by defining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Halberstam prefers to be referred to by masculine pronouns. 
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success and figuring failure in its wake.  Couching his discussion of success and 
failure in the context of “a heternormative, capitalist society,” Halberstam argues that 
such societies equate success with “specific forms of reproductive maturity combined 
with wealth accumulation” (Halberstam, 2011:2).  Halberstam’s aim is to deploy 
queer failure to interrupt and disrupt hetero-maturity and wealth accumulation 
(2011:92).  To do this, Halberstam makes two important moves.   
 First, he claims failure as something intrinsic to queers. 10  Halberstam writes 
of failure as “something queers do and have always done exceptionally well” 
(2011:3).  Not only do queers fail, they fail with flair.  “[F]or queers, failure can be a 
style, to cite Quentin Crisp, or a way of life, to cite Foucault” (2011:3).  Given this, 
Halberstam suggests that queers are the prototypes of failure (2011:3). 
 Second, Halberstam specifically figures queer failure by using all the elements 
Haraway associates with figuration.  Queer failure is worlding because if success is 
the heterosexual matrix that establishes “the punishing norms that discipline behavior 
and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly 
childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods” (2011:3), then queer failure (like 
failure itself) is “the map of political paths not taken” (2011:19).  Still on the map but 
perversely off course, Halberstam claims queer failure challenges heterosexual 
orthodoxies and how they model queer lives and queer futures.   
 Queer failure is temporal because it rejects developmental temporalities (to 
normatively grow up, reproduce, and accumulate capital) that lead to theoretical and 
personal maturity in the terms successful theorizing and living demand (2011:3).  As 
such, queer failure repudiates the salvation narrative found in classical Christian and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In The Queer Art of Failure, Halberstam gestures at what the terms “queer” and “queers” mean but 
does not offer definitive definitions.  “Queers” appear to be those who fail by not achieving “specific 
[heteronormative] forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation” (Halberstam, 
2011:92), while “queer” seems to denote the positive embracing of this form of heteronormative failure.  
There are innumerable other ways to define queer and queers.  See e.g. Jagose (1997) or Halperin 
(2003). 
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contemporary secular figurations.  The temporality of queer failure is instead a 
counter-temporality – a refusal to mature in heteronormative terms – that is situated 
more broadly in Halberstam’s Gramscian-inspired counter-hegemonic queer politics. 
 Queer failure’s reliance upon tropes is evidenced by its figurative rather than 
literal strategies to interrupt and disrupt success.  For example, queer failure might 
strategically inhabit stupidity – not literally by lacking knowledge but figuratively by 
miming “unteachablity” in the modes of conduct prescribed by the dominant 
heterosexist matrix.  By displacing ‘real stupidity’ for “figural stupidity”, queer 
failure exposes “the limits of certain forms of knowing and certain ways of inhabiting 
structures of knowing” (Halberstam, 2011:11-12; Ranciere, 1991).  In this way, queer 
failure becomes a refusal to be read, which becomes a refusal to be normatively 
streamed down the pathways of success. 
 Finally, queer failure is performative because – as the ritualistic repetition of 
undiscipinable performances by queer bodies that are incongruous with the dominant 
heterosexist matrix – queer failure interrupts and disrupts success and produces 
alternative images of (un)being and (un)knowing that failing queer bodies might 
inhabit (Halberstam, 2011:23). 
 Not all failure is queer failure.  For example, Halberstam argues that the film  
Trainspotting illustrates “unqueer failure”.  For even though the characters in this film 
reject productive love and wealth accumulation, their drug-fueled lifestyle becomes 
“the rage of the excluded white male, a rage that promises and delivers punishments 
for women and people of color” (2011:92).  In contrast, Halberstam argues that queer 
failure is a negativity that interrupts and disrupts heteromaturity and wealth 
accumulation – and is “productively linked to racial awareness, anticolonial struggle, 
gender variance, and different formulations of the temporality of success” (2011:92). 
 Collectively, these points allow Halberstam to tell the story of failure 
differently, as “a tale of anticapitalist, queer struggle” set within a narrative about 
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“anticolonial struggle, the refusal of legibility, and an art of unbecoming” (2011:88).  
In that story, queer failure is “a way of refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of 
power and discipline and [is] a form of critique” (2011:88; my brackets). 
 Were Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure to live up to its promise and 
were it to be embraced by international theorists and applied to international theories, 
it might well achieve for international theories what Halberstam argues it achieves for 
queer theory.  It might elevate the detours of international theories off the disciplinary 
pathways of success into valued  philosophical insights.  This could bring Queer 
International Theory “into existence”.  For if, as Halberstam suggests, “queer is the art 
of elevating perversion to philosophy” (Halberstam, quoted in Ristic, 2013), then 
Queer International Theory might be accepted as an (artful) instance of elevating 
“queer perversions” of IR’s disciplinary pathways to knowledges, practices, and 
power into valuable queer philosophical insights about Queer International Politics.   
 This might be an attractive option for IR scholars doing queer international 
theorizing.  Yet it would require several leaps of faith on their part to move from 
Halberstam’s celebration of queer failure to a Queer International Theory that is not 
so hampered by disciplinary knowledges, practices and power that they would be left 
with anything to celebrate.  This is not only because many of the positions Halberstam 
attributes to queer failure are worthy political aims he attaches to queer failure rather 
than generates from it (e.g., that queer failure is necessarily anticolonial, illegible, 
counter hetero-/homo-normative and counter-hegemonic), making his claims more 
idealistic than realistic.  It is also because, as Halberstam figures it, queer failure does 
not ultimately “dismantle the logics of success and failure with which we currently 
live” (Halberstam, 2011:1).  Rather, Halberstam performs a radical reversal – not a 
dismantling - of success and failure with his notion of queer failure, marking success 
as something that fails queer bodies and failure as something that successfully 
liberates queer bodies from the burdens of conventionally-understood success and 
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failure (2011:3-4). 
 From the standpoint of a Disciplinary IR (un)consciously governed by Wight’s 
homologizing technology of the conduct of international theorizing, nothing could be 
more alarming.  For the point of Wight’s homologization and its figuration of failure 
is to move IR scholars from the “perversion” of misapplying themselves to their 
studies of international politics to correcting how and what they study.  This spirit is 
encapsulated in the title of Barry Buzan and Richard Little’s Wight-inspired essay, 
“Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do 
About it” (2001).  If this analysis of Wight’s figuration of failure tells us anything, it 
is that charting the course toward international theories’ salvation was always Wight’s 
motivation for naming their sins. 
 Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure ultimately proves unhelpful for 
escaping Wight’s homologization not primarily because it departs from Wight by 
celebrating “the sin” of failure.  Rather, Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure is at 
its weakest where it charts the very same course as does Wight’s homology.  That 
course is to take the worlds and the mappings of success and failure (but not, in 
Halberstam’s case, their values) as given.  In so doing, both Wight and Halberstam 
overlook how “figurations are condensed maps of contestable worlds” (Haraway, 
1997:11, my emphasis).  To call these contestable worlds into question requires not 
just revaluing their terms but challenging how they are mapped. 
 It comes as no surprise that Wight performs this neglect in how he maps 
success and failure.  For he attempts to place any contestability of his worlding 
practices beyond discussion through his recourse to ‘mathematics’.  Not only does 
Wight definitively figure international theories as failures by excluding them from his 
equation.  Wight figures success as something that can only be achieved by following 
Wight’s dubious calculations. 
 What is more surprising is that Halberstam performs this same neglect, by 
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never contesting how “the dominant system” maps success and failure.  For while he 
revalues failure as success and argues that “[f]ailure is the map of political paths not 
taken,” he still insists that failure “does not chart a completely separate land; failure’s 
by-ways are all the spaces in between the superhighways of [intellectual] capital” 
(2011:19; my brackets).  In charting these specific pathways to queer failure, 
Halberstam accepts a worlding of success and failure that is strikingly similar to 
Wight’s.  This allows Wight’s chartings of successful international theoretical 
practice (“studying the states-system, the diplomatic community itself”; Wight, 
1966:22), knowledge (the developmental, cumulative, and representational result of 
this practice) and power (the disciplinary capital one acquires by being practically and 
knowledgably successful) to remain intact.  What this means is that “the punishing 
norms that discipline behavior and manage human development” (Halberstam, 
2011:3) – while disavowed by Halberstam – continue to be applied to any theory that 
would dare to call itself International Theory. 
 Halberstam’s neglect to query success is, I suspect, a result of his 
overinvestment in failure.  For Halberstam imbues failure with an authentically queer 
essence.  Were he to remap success - tear up its maps, dig up its roads, focus on how 
success employs its power to zigzag around and pave over its own innumerable 
failures in its attempt to make us think it never swerves from literal-mindedness – he 
would also be required to remap failure, rethink queer, and rethink his investment in 
queer failure. This may well explain why Halberstam, like Wight, places the pathways 
(but not the value) of success beyond contestability. 
 Were IR scholars doing queer international theorizing to embrace 
Halberstam’s celebration of queer failure, they would suffer from these same 
shortcomings.  As a result, they would not disrupt Disciplinary IR’s ideal of 
disciplinary success anymore than Halberstam does, even as they repudiated 
disciplinary success in favor of a Queer International Theory revalued as successful 
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failure.  Should they embrace this move, it could have three unwanted consequences.  
First, it could further exclude Queer IR scholars from participating in refiguring what 
success and failure mean for/in Disciplinary IR and how they are applied to 
international theorizing.  Second, it could forfeit any demand that Disciplinary IR 
evaluate queer international theories as successful in terms that Discipline IR already 
regards as constituting success – contributing to understandings about interstate 
relations.  Finally, it could unwittingly confirm what Disciplinary IR already believes 
– that Queer International Theory is not a figuration it wishes to inhabit.   
 As a field shamed by its failure and determined to achieve success in 
conventional terms, celebrations of queer failure may not only convince Disciplinary 
IR that Queer International Theory does not exist.  They may convince the discipline 
more generally that Queer International Theory must not exist.   For this reason 
celebrations of queer failure may unintentionally participate in authorizing the final 
step in Disciplinary IR’s disavowal of queer international theories. That step is 
gentrification. 
 
 
Gentrifying Failure 
 
 
“There is a gentrification that happens to buildings and neighborhoods and there is a 
gentrification that happens to ideas”. 
    -- Artist Penny Arcade, 1996 (quoted in Schulman, 2012:29) 
 
 
 In this section, I argue that Wight’s homology authorizes the substitution of 
ideas produced by “failing” queer international theories with ideas produced by a 
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“successful” type of International Theory of Disciplinary IR’s choosing.  To make 
this argument, I apply Sarah Schulman’s analysis of what she calls “the gentrification 
of the mind” (2012) to a discussion of what I call ‘the neighborhood of IR’.  
 Conceptualizing IR as a neighborhood is gestured toward but not elaborated on 
in Anna Agathangelou and LHM Ling’s “The House of IR”, in which they map 
relations among IR traditions as those of a multi-generational family lead by “Grand 
Pater Imperialism” and “Grand Mater Capitalism” and their spawn including Realism 
and Liberalism living upstairs, with support from “Native-Informant Servants” like 
Area Studies living downstairs.  While Agathangelou and Ling’s characterization of 
IR as a house offers useful insights into how IR is organized, it does not capture the 
movement amongst traditions within the discipline.  We get no sense of the comings 
and goings of “family members,” of who gets booted out of a bedroom to 
accommodate a new arrival, of whose intellectual capital is rising or falling, and of 
which tradition has accepted a makeover to avoid being shunned.  If we were to 
remap IR as a neighborhood, the dynamic nature of the discipline would be more 
apparent.  We could take account of who is sitting on prime real estate, how 
urban/disciplinary blight and renewal shake things up, and how (re)zoning organizes 
IR’s complex living arrangements.  Diagramed in this way, one specific force 
organizing the houses of IR would become apparent – gentrification.  
 The term gentrification was coined by the British sociologist Ruth Glass to 
describe “the influx of middle-class people to cities and neighborhoods, displacing the 
lower-class worker residents” (Schulman, 2012:24).   But as the artist Penny Arcade 
notes, gentrification does not just happen to buildings and neighborhoods.  It also 
happens to ideas.  Sarah Schulman traces how the physical gentrification of “failing” 
urban neighborhoods leads to the gentrification of ideas, what she calls “the 
gentrification of the mind” (Schulman, 2012).  For by moving diverse people out of 
buildings, one is also moving diverse ideas out of neighborhoods. 
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 Schulman describes gentrification as the replacement of mix with homogeneity 
while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (Schulman, 2012).  Among the 
key elements Schulman identifies as part of the gentrification process are substitution, 
homogenization, and assimilation. 
 Substitution refers to the physical replacement of mix with sameness.  Thanks to 
zoning laws that refigure where prime real estate is located, formerly poor, mixed, 
“failing” neighborhoods are “regenerated” by moving in wealthy, predominantly 
white residents.  As wealthy residents move in, high-class businesses appear, real 
estate and rental prices soar, and poor residents are priced out of their own 
neighborhoods. 
 This has the effect not only of driving out people marked by difference.  It also 
re-categorizes these “different” residents as dangers to newly gentrified communities.  
“The relaxed nature of neighborhood living becomes threatening, something to be 
eradicated and controlled” (2012:28).  This is because gentrifiers “brought the values 
of the gated community and a willingness to trade freedom for security” with them 
(2012:30) and therefore “sought a comfort in overpowering the natives, rather than 
becoming them” (2012:30). 
 As former residents disappear, so too do their ideas and ways of living.  The 
lived realities, tastes, points of view and stories of the rich and powerful replace those 
of former inhabitants.  Traces remain, but in the form of what Schulman calls “the 
‘fusion’ phenomena.”  Fusion is expressed by the kind of food one sees in gentrified 
neighborhoods – food with “toned-down flavors, made with higher quality ingredients 
and at significantly higher prices, usually owned by whites, usually serving whites.”  
More troublingly, it is equally present in the toned-down, ever-blander, simplistic, and 
superficial ideas that replace the complexity of ideas and relationships that marked 
pre-gentrified mixed neighborhoods (2012:31).  This intellectual homogenization is 
part of what Schulman means when she refers to the gentrification of the mind. 
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 Because they control the story that is told about themselves, gentrifiers believe 
“that corporate support for and inflation of their story is in fact a neutral and accurate 
picture of the world” (2012:28).  In this way, gentrification erases not only difference 
but the economic, political, social, and cultural privilege that makes it possible for 
gentrifiers to erase difference because “gentrification is a process that hides the 
apparatus of domination from the dominant themselves” (2012:27). 
 Not only is gentrification naturalized as a pure good, with the costs to replaced 
populations erased.  Gentrification encourages all those living in gentrified 
neighborhoods to internalize gentrified values and assimilate to gentrified modes of 
conduct.  As Schulman explains it, “There is a weird passivity that accompanies 
gentrification” (2012:33).  “It’s like a hypnotic identification with authority” 
(2012:34) which brings with it “an acceptance of banality, a concept of self based 
falsely in passivity, an inability to realize one’s self as a powerful instigator and agent 
of profound social change” (2012:13-14).  This is the final component of what 
Schulman calls the gentrification of the mind. 
 Schulman made her argument to explain the 1990s gentrification of her East 
Village New York City neighborhood and how this gentrification was enabled in part 
by the loss of a generation of edgy artists and queer activists to AIDS.  What 
Schulman observed in her neighborhood parallels the theoretical gentrification of the 
neighborhood of IR, where substitution, homogenization, and assimilation have 
replaced the “wrong” kinds of theoretical, epistemological, and methodological mix 
with Disciplinary homogeneity while pretending difference and privilege do not exist 
(Schulman, 2012).   
 The poorest neighborhoods of IR have always been those populated by new 
intellectual immigrants to IR.  These include Marxists, poststructuralists, feminists, 
critical race scholars, postcolonial scholars, critical studies scholars and queer studies 
scholars.  These scholars are poor because they wield the least disciplinary capital in 
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IR.  This is because their analyses deviate from an exclusive focus on “the states-
system, the diplomatic community itself” (Wight, 1966:22) and because they refuse 
Disciplinary IR’s epistemological and methodological claims about knowledge 
collection and accumulation.  Rather, these residents debate everything from post-
positivism to gender and sexuality hierarchies to the global dominance of 
neoliberalism and empire as well as how and why these ideas, epistemologies, 
methodologies and phenomena shape international politics. 
 There have been numerous turf wars amongst these scholars over the years, yet 
for the most part this mix of relative newcomers to the discipline have peacefully 
lived together in their broadly-defined “critical theory” enclave (Cox, 1981), a kind of 
East Village of multiple, interdisciplinary-mixed IRs whose residents have relatives in 
a vast range of other disciplinary neighborhoods.  From time to time, Disciplinary IR 
scholars have visited this enclave to sample its ideas.  This happens most frequently 
when Disciplinary IR is in crisis, as it was, for example, when it failed to predict the 
end of the Cold War.  During that period in the late 1980s/early 1990s, this East 
Village of IRs became a go-to location for new insights into the workings of 
international politics.  This put critical IR on Disciplinary IR’s map as an up-and-
coming area, thus raising the disciplinary capital of critical IR scholars, however 
temporarily. 
 But visits by Disciplinary IR scholars to this area could be dangerous.  The 
ideas and approaches of Disciplinary IR scholars were not accorded the same respect 
here as they were elsewhere in the discipline (e.g., Ashley, 1984; Weber, 2010).  
What some Disciplinary IR scholars saw as their generous engagements with and 
support for emerging critical IR traditions were met with what they experienced as 
aggressive assaults on their core ideas and on the character of Disciplinary IR itself.  
In contrast, critical IR scholars saw themselves battling to save their neighborhood 
from IR’s disciplinary takeover (see Keohane, 1989; and in reply Weber, 1994).  
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These “non-productive” engagements added to the growing sense that critical IR was 
failing Disciplinary IR (Holsti, 1985).  For, at least from Disciplinary IR’s 
perspective, these exchanges introduced dangerous mix into disciplinary homogeneity 
(Keohane, 1998) and detracted from rather than enhanced IR’s core goal – to 
progressively accumulate knowledge about interstate wars.   
 Once critical IR was marked as a failure, it could legitimately be “regenerated” 
by “overpowering the natives, rather than becoming them” (Schulman, 2012:30).  
Employing the gentrification toolkit, Disciplinary IR first re-zoned critical IR’s 
enclave and then subjected it to substitutions.  Recognizing that this peripheral area 
producing marginalized intellectual ideas could potentially re-center and revive a 
discipline in crisis, some Disciplinary IR scholars took up residence in this edgy 
neighborhood.  As their numbers reached a (non)critical mass, institutional authorities 
took notice and amended publishing and hiring strategies that effectively re-zoned this 
outlying turf as central to disciplinary regeneration.  But making critical IR’s areas of 
investigation central to Disciplinary IR’s regeneration came with costs.  Those costs 
were incurred through the gentrification strategies of substitution, homogenization, 
and assimilation. 
 The hard, troubling, political edges of critical IR were substituted with the 
softer, more soothing critiques of Disciplinary IR that left most critical politics 
behind.  A generalized international political economy replaced Marxism (Strange, 
1988), “the gender variable” replaced feminism (Jones, 1996; in reply see Carver, 
Cochran, and Squires, 1998), constructivism replaced poststructuralism (Wendt, 
1992), “the clash of civilizations” replaced critical race and postcolonial studies 
(Huntington, 1993), and “soft power” in the service of state power replaced cultural 
critique (Nye, 2004).  This is not to say that critical IR traditions disappeared.  Rather, 
they were pushed off what was becoming some of the discipline’s prime real estate 
and beyond the barricades of Disciplinary IR’s newly-erected gated communities 
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(e.g., most of IR’s top 20 journals).  This made critical IR’s status in the discipline all 
the more precarious, which enabled the homogenization of critical IR’s ideas through 
“the fusion effect.”  This created toned-down gentrified versions of critical IR’s ideas 
that were compatible with both what Disciplinary IR most valued (being “a realist and 
a statist”, e.g. Wendt, 1992) and what Disciplinary IR viewed as being critical 
enough.  
 With homogenization came assimilation.  From the perspective of “old school” 
critical IR scholars, gentrified “critical” IR scholars exhibited “a weird passivity” 
(Schulman, 2012:33) about the political stakes of critical IR aims and “a hypnotic 
identification with authority” (Schulman, 2012:34) as they themselves became the 
new authorities within Disciplinary IR (Wendt, 1992).  There seemed to be little if 
any critical self-reflection on how disciplinary privilege and power enabled and 
sustained this reorganizing of IR’s living arrangements.  And there seemed to be no 
awareness within Disciplinary IR that its attempts to insulate itself from internal 
critique limited its ability to generate expert knowledge about international politics 
broadly and narrowly defined.  Or, to put it in Schulman’s terms, Disciplinary IR did 
not grasp the relationship between the gentrification of a neighborhood and “the 
gentrification of the mind” (Schulman, 2012).   
 In fairness to Disciplinary IR scholars who were practicing at this time, how 
could they have grasped this connection?  How could they have avoided doing 
precisely what they did?  For the gentrification of critical IR had it roots not just in the 
failure of IR to predict the end of the Cold War.  It had its roots in Martin Wight’s 
famous homology.  This may well have had two (un)conscious consequences. 
 First, it may have stirred up Disciplinary IR’s nagging doubts about the 
discipline of IR.  It may have led Disciplinary IR scholars to ask if Wight was right, if 
IR is a failing disciple because it produces no successful International Theory.  Even 
though Wight’s test of success is not predicting future events but rather accumulating 
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knowledge about states and the states system, Disciplinary (and especially Realist) IR 
scholars at the time lamented the fact that the knowledge they had been accumulating 
about international politics left them blindsided by the end of the Cold War.  As a 
result, securing the viability of the discipline urgently rose to the top of many 
Disciplinary IR scholars’ agendas.   
 Second, while Wight’s iconic reading of International Theory as failure may 
have stung at this time, it also provided the solution Disciplinary IR scholars needed.  
If Wight could rescue the discipline of IR by substituting Historical Interpretation for 
failing international theories, then Disciplinary IR could substitute all manner of 
discipline-supporting gentrified theories for discipline-challenging critical theories of 
these multiple IRs.  (Un)consciously taking Wight’s homology as their licensing 
proof, Disciplinary IR scholars not only erased much of the critical difference within 
IR; they seemed to do so without any consideration of how this might impoverish IR 
intellectually.  This is because – as Wight’s homology taught them – securing 
disciplinary success overrides insuring intellectual freedom. 
 Following in Wight’s footsteps, Disciplinary IR continues to make these moves. 
It substitutes “successful” (often gentrified) International Theory wherever and 
whenever “failed” international theories threaten it with good, but unpalatable, ideas 
and challenges. 
 Which brings us back to queer international theories.  Queer international 
theories are ripe for gentrification by Disciplinary IR for three reasons.  First, queer 
international theories are producing intellectual insights that could prove valuable to 
the discipline.  By analyzing how sexual- and gender-variant identities, hierarchies, 
institutions, and systems function internationally, it investigates war, security, 
terrorism, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, and foreign 
policy more generally and contributes to understandings of interstate wars and 
international politics understood more broadly.   
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 Second, queer international theories occupy just enough real estate for the 
discipline to take an interest in their (re)-generation.  Thanks to support from the ISA 
via the LGBTQA Caucus and the Feminist and Gender Section, queer international 
theories are slowly but steadily being institutionalized into the neighborhood of IR.  
 Third, by breaking most of the rules about what successful International Theory 
is supposed to be (singular, focused exclusively on interstate wars, respectful of 
political theory/international theory and domestic/international boundaries, eschewing 
“low theory,” driven to accumulate disciplinary knowledge without questioning 
disciplinary knowledge in epistemologically and methodologically “unproductive 
ways”), queer international theories are figured as failures in Wight’s terms.  Taken 
together, this means that queer international theories might be just enough of a 
success in their own terms and just enough of a failure in Disciplinary IR’s terms for 
the discipline more broadly to at some point in the not-to-distant future come to 
regard queer international theories as (another) dangerous difference that must be re-
zoned.  
  How might queer international theories be gentrified?  Or, to ask this question in 
Wight’s terms:  If queer international theories were to be homologized as Queer 
Politics:Queer International Politics = Queer Theory:X, what might “X” out queer 
international theories?   
 Queer international theories would likely be “X” out by some form of gentrified 
“Critical” International Theory.  If Disciplinary IR associated queer international 
theories with poststructuralism, then they would likely be substituted with 
constructivism.  If they were associated with feminism, then queer international 
theories might be placed in a “sexuality variable” that strips them of all political 
critique (Weber, 1998c).  If they were associated with cultural studies, then they 
might be mobilized for their soft power in the service of state power.  And so on.  In 
whatever way they might be substituted, homogenized, and assimilated, queer 
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international theories in anything resembling their current form would be gentrified 
out of existence.  This would allow Disciplinary IR scholars and gentrified “critical” 
IR scholars alike to authoritatively declare about gentrified “Queer” International 
Theory, “There is Queer International Theory.  It does exist.  But only on our terms, 
which are Wight’s terms.” 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Queer Politics:Queer International Politics = Queer Theory:X 
 
 
Queer Politics is to Queer International Politics as Queer Theory is to X.  
Following Wight’s homologization of international theories, this is what a 
Disciplinary IR consideration of queer international theories looks like.  As I have 
argued, thinking about queer international theories in this way is fatal to any genuine 
reflection on queer international theories in three ways.  It homologizes queer 
international theories in their present form out of existence.  It legitimates the 
figuration of queer international theories as failures.  And it allows for the substitution 
of queer international theories with a gentrified “X” of Disciplinary IR’s choosing. 
This approach to queer international theories is a non-approach because it 
concludes in advance that Queer International Theory does not and must not exist, at 
least in its present form.  This is because queer international theories exceed the limits 
Wight’s homology sets for Disciplinary IR ontologically, epistemologically, 
methodologically, and politically.  As my analysis demonstrates, this non-approach to 
queer international theories is an entrenched, if unconscious, mode of managing the 
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conduct of all international theories by regulating how IR scholars are expected to 
think about and produce International Theory.  
This analysis makes evident the detrimental effects of this regulation on queer 
international theorists and critical international theorists more broadly (e.g., Duggan, 
1995).  Even so, it can be difficult for queer and critical scholars to give up on their 
attachments to Disciplinary IR, if doing so means relinquishing their demands for 
either disciplinary capital or disciplinary change.  Yet as the case of Queer 
International Theory implies, the best Disciplinary IR can offer queer and critical IR 
scholars is “cruel optimism” (Berlant, 2006).  In the context of IR, cruel optimism 
expresses a relation of attachment to Disciplinary IR that promises only compromised 
conditions of possibility for queer and critical IR’s existence and practice.11  
This suggests a fourth potential answer to the question, “Why does there 
appear to be no Queer International Theory?”  Answer 4:  “IR scholars doing queer 
international theorizing might have given up on submitting their work for Disciplinary 
IR’s approval either because they have internalized Disciplinary IR’s judgment of 
themselves and their work as failures or because Disciplinary IR (with few 
exceptions) publishes a form of Queer International Theory that evacuates their queer 
international theorizing out of existence.”  For Queer IR and other critical IR scholars 
who can afford to pursue it, this strategy of non-engagement with IR makes perfect 
intellectual sense.12  But it in no way holds Disciplinary IR accountable for the 
disciplinary capital it passes off as intellectual capital or for how this writes over 
alternative intellectual dispositions and writes out of the discipline many of the 
scholars who practice them.  Instead, because it leave IR’s disciplinary maps of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 I am paraphrasing Berlant:  “’Cruel optimism’ names a relation of attachment to compromised 
conditions of possibility” (Berlant, 2006:21). 
12 Non-engagement with one’s discipline is often the luxury of the tenured, the promoted, and the 
disciplinarily and geographically re-locatable.  For scholars not in these positions, non-engagement 
with queer international theory is often the easier strategy than non-engagement with Disciplinary IR.  
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success and failure intact, this strategy licenses the continued concentration of 
disciplinary capital as if it were intellectual capital in the elites and elite institutions of 
the discipline that toe the Disciplinary IR line. 
Queer and critical non-engagement on the one hand or their gentrification on 
the other may bring comfort to Disciplinary IR, as its power is further centralized, its 
ontology, epistemology, methodology, and their politics are spared critical “attacks,” 
its “pluralist” practices are evidenced by gentrified Queer International Theory, and 
its disciplinary status is secured.  Yet the discipline more broadly has much to lose by 
allowing Disciplinary IR to regulate queer and other critical international theories to 
the point of non-engagement.  Regulation not only limits how international politics is 
enriched by critical inquiry (Butler, 2009).  It cedes considerations of key 
international phenomena – narrowly and broadly defined – to other academic 
disciplines.  This is precisely what has been happening over the past decade with 
investigations of queer international politics.  Global Queer Studies generates the 
principal research on how sexual and gender variance bear on core IR concerns like 
war and peace, state and nation formation, and international political economy.  This 
makes Global Queer Studies – not Queer IR – the intellectual leader in this field.13   
Not only should it embarrass Disciplinary IR and the discipline as a whole that 
the best [recognized] queer international theories (and many of the best critical 
international theories; e.g., Butler, 2009) are being produced by scholars who make no 
claim to be IR scholars or to be generating International Theory.  It should alert the 
discipline to the fact that by disciplining intellectual critique out of existence, 
Disciplinary IR makes the discipline ill-equipped to deliver on its claim to uniquely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I am not suggesting that Queer Global Studies should replace Queer IR.  As with disciplinary IR, I 
also have concerns about how GQS – an interdisciplinary approach which is generally regulated by 
humanities-oriented disciplinary codes – often “X’s” out Queer IR.  Instead, I am arguing for some 
configuration of Queer IR that might challenge if not escape disciplinary homologization, figuration, 
and gentrification altogether. 
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produce comprehensive, expert knowledge about international politics.  It is this that 
makes the discipline of IR look like a failure on its own terms.   
By closing itself off from or by correcting out of existence “different” 
international relations theories that trouble its conceptualization of the discipline, 
Disciplinary IR paradoxically makes trouble for the discipline.  Yet it repeats these 
mistakes over and over because it has internalized Wight’s characterization of the 
discipline’s problems and how to solve them.  But as the case of Queer International 
Theory demonstrates, Wight’s homology does not lead to disciplinary success.  It 
keeps IR scholars from participating fully in conversations about international 
politics, like those taking place in Global Queer Studies.  And it conditions IR 
scholars to be so preoccupied with how they might fail in the discipline by taking part 
in these conversations that they paradoxically fail the discipline on its own terms by 
declining to take part in them. 
All this suggests that Wight’s homology is as cruelly optimistic – as enabling 
as it is disabling (Berlant, 2006:21) – for Disciplinary IR scholars as it is for 
“different” international theorists.  This is because Wight’s homology enables the 
discipline to exist only by disabling the discipline’s ability to succeed.   As a result, 
IR’s disciplinary attachment to Wight’s homology compromises possibilities for 
doing international theory and thinking international politics not only on the terms the 
discipline rejects (Shapiro, 2013) but on the terms the discipline embraces. 
It is time to heed the warnings signs of this case and reconsider what 
successful international theories must be and must do.  To achieve this, the discipline 
of IR must let go of Wight’s homology as its guide to disciplinary success and failure. 
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